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Abstract 
 
It was hypothesized that attitudes will become 
most polarized when individuals have an 
opportunity for thought about a group for 
which they “tune in” a well-developed 
schema that is consistent with initial 
information. This process should be greater 
for low need than high need for cognition 
thinkers. Participants were given different 
opportunities for thought about either freedom 
fighters or rebel insurgents. Initial 
information was either consistent or 
inconsistent with group descriptors. 
Participants completed the Need for 
Cognition Scale. These hypotheses were 
partially supported. Attitudes were more 
polarized when participants tuned in a schema 
that was consistent with initial information. 
Limitations of this investigation (e.g., no 
manipulation checks) and future directions 
(e.g., direct assessment of schemas) are 
discussed.  
 
 
 
 On early morning September 11, 
2001, you slowly move around your house 
preparing for the day ahead. You sit down 
with a cup of coffee to watch the morning 
news. You flip on your television and stop 
dead in your tracks. What is going on? Did 
they just say that an airplane flew into the 
North Tower of the World Trade Center? It 
was just a freak accident. What was that? 
Right before your eyes, another airplane flies 
directly into the South Tower. Your pulse 
quickens as you try to comprehend what just 
happened. Minutes later, you watch as the 
Twin Towers collapse crushing thousands of 
human beings under a mass of steel, concrete, 
and flames.  
 Now, no matter which channel you 
turn to, all that you see is footage of 
destruction. The Pentagon is in flames, both 
of the Twin Towers have collapsed, and 
another plane crashed down in a Pennsylvania 
field. What is that news anchor saying? 
Middle Eastern male terrorists are responsible 
for highjacking and crashing all of these 
planes. Why would they want to do 
something that horrible to us? By eleven 
o’clock, you watch in stunned disbelief as our 
government closes all airspace surrounding 
the United States. These Middle Eastern 
terrorists just committed the deadliest attack 
on American soil since the December 1941 
attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese. 
 How did you feel when you read about 
these events? Were you thoughtful, sad, 
angry, or depressed? Have you ever glanced 
at a group of Middle Eastern individuals and 
wondered if, perhaps, they too were secretly 
involved in a terrorist plot against the United 
States? Now that you reminisced about 
September 11th, you may notice that the 
longer you think about these events, the 
stronger your emotions about these events 
(i.e., September 11th attacks) become. Many 
researchers (e.g., Tesser, 1978) have 
conducted studies in which participants affect 
their own feelings about an attitude object 
(i.e., a person, place, or thing) just by thinking 
about that object. 
 
    
Self-Generated Attitude Change 
 Mere thought about an attitude object 
(i.e., a person, place, or thing) is sufficient to 
produce self-generated attitude change (for 
literature reviews, see Tesser, 1978, and 
Tesser, Martin & Mendolia, 1995). The 
phenomenon of self-generated attitude change 
occurs when individuals experience attitude 
polarization following an opportunity for 
thought. During this process of attitude 
polarization, individuals’ initially favorable 
attitudes become more favorable or initially 
unfavorable attitudes become more 
unfavorable. In sum, individuals may change 
their attitudes simply as a result of thought.  
 In a study on impression formation, 
for example, Sadler and Tesser (1973) asked 
participants to evaluate either a likeable or 
dislikeable research partner. Once they made 
an initial evaluation of their partners, 
participants were either asked to think about 
their partners or were distracted from thinking 
about their partners. During a second 
evaluation of their partners, participants who 
were asked to think about their partners 
evaluated likeable partners more positively 
and evaluated dislikeable partners more 
negatively than participants who were 
distracted from thinking about their partner. 
Thus, individuals experience attitude 
polarization after engaging in thought. 
  How do changes in individuals’ 
attitudes occur? There are two processes 
involved in self-generated attitude change 
(Tesser, 1978; Tesser et al., 1995). First, 
when individuals think about an attitude 
object, they tend to modify their beliefs in 
order to make beliefs about that attitude 
object consistent with one another (e.g., 
Chaiken & Yates, 1985; Leone, 1984). 
Second, individuals tend to have feelings (i.e., 
attitudes) about an attitude object based on 
current beliefs these individuals hold about 
that attitude object (e.g., Leone, 1991; Leone 
& Aronow, 1992; Liberman & Chaiken, 
1991). That is, individuals make their beliefs 
consistent through thought and, in turn, base 
their feelings on those consistent beliefs. 
These processes are a foundation for self-
generated attitude change.      
 When individuals engage in thought, 
they can modify the evaluative consistency of 
their attitude-related beliefs (Tesser, 1978; 
Tesser et al., 1995). Evaluative consistency is 
consistency along a good-bad dimension 
(Liberman & Chaiken, 1991). That is, if 
individuals believe that something is bad, then 
they may modify their beliefs in order to 
maintain their negative evaluation. If 
individuals believe that something is good, 
then they may modify their beliefs in order to 
maintain their positive evaluation. Individuals 
maintain evaluative consistency when they 
think about an attitude object (i.e., person, 
place, or thing) by generating additional 
information consistent with other beliefs held 
about that object (Tesser & Cowan, 1975), 
reinterpreting otherwise ambiguous 
information to become consistent with beliefs 
held about that object (Tesser & Cowan, 
1977), or discounting information that is 
inconsistent with beliefs held about that 
object (Lord, 1989; Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 
1979; Miller, McHoskey, Bane, & Dowd, 
1993). If an experimenter, for instance, 
describes a group of people to a participant as 
warm, intelligent, and hard-working, then that 
participant may also generate additional 
belief-consistent thoughts such as diligent, 
strong, and kind. If an experimenter 
introduces to that participant another group 
trait (e.g., selfish) and this new trait is not 
consistent with other beliefs held by that 
participant concerning such a group, then one 
of two reactions could occur. This participant 
could attempt to reinterpret the trait selfish to 
mean that this group being described is 
absorbed in work duties and enjoys receiving 
credit for achievements. This participant 
could also attempt to discard the trait selfish 
all together because that trait does not fit in 
with his or her beliefs concerning this group. 
In other words, individuals tend to maintain 
information that is evaluatively consistent 
with their initial beliefs about an attitude 
object and discard or reinterpret information 
that is evaluatively inconsistent with their 
initial beliefs about an attitude object. 
 In sum, individuals are able to modify 
via thought the evaluative consistency of their 
    
beliefs about an attitude object and use those 
beliefs as a basis for their feelings (i.e., 
attitudes). The longer these individuals spend 
thinking about an attitude object, the more 
likely they are to experience attitude 
polarization (see Tesser, 1978, and Tesser et 
al., 1995, for review of the literature). 
Individuals showed evidence of experiencing 
thought-belief and belief-feeling processes 
during self-generated attitude change while 
thinking about research partners (e.g., Sadler 
& Tesser, 1973), fashions and football (e.g., 
Leone & Tesser, 1977), capital punishment 
(e.g., Chaiken & Yates, 1985), and political 
issues (e.g., Leone, 1994). 
 Role of schemas. When provided with 
an opportunity for thought, why do 
individuals tend to experience attitude 
polarization rather than some other type of 
attitude change? Changes in beliefs brought 
about during thought are not random but are 
instead based on individuals’ cognitive 
schemata (Leone & Ensley, 1985, 1986; 
Tesser & Leone, 1977). A cognitive schema is 
“a cognitive structure that represents 
knowledge about a concept or type of 
stimulus, including its attributes and the 
relations among the attributes” (Fiske & 
Taylor, 1991, p. 91). In essence, a schema is a 
“naïve theory” held by an individual 
concerning an attitude object (Leone & 
Ensley, 1985; Tesser & Leone, 1977). When 
individuals think about an attitude object, they 
may access stored knowledge (i.e., cognitive 
schemas) about that particular attitude object 
(Tesser & Leone, 1977).    
 How do individuals develop these 
naïve theories (i.e., schemas) about a 
particular attitude object? Some individuals 
may rely upon outside sources such as news 
media. Media coverage of the September 11th 
attacks on the World Trade Center in New 
York may be an example of individuals’ 
reliance upon outside sources in developing 
cognitive schemas. For many weeks 
following the September 11th attacks, 
individuals viewed images of both Middle 
Eastern airline highjackers and destruction of 
the World Trade Center. Individuals viewing 
these images from outside sources (i.e., news 
media) may create their own Middle Eastern 
terrorist schema because of this repeated 
association between ethnicity of September 
11th highjackers and destruction of the World 
Trade Center.     
 Individuals may use their schemas as 
sources of attitude-related beliefs (e.g., 
generation of additional beliefs) as well as 
rules (e.g., reinterpretation and discounting of 
beliefs) for processing attitude relevant ideas 
(Tesser, 1978; Tesser et al., 1995). In other 
words, individuals may use their schemas to 
determine what information they can deduce 
(i.e., generation of beliefs), what information 
they can substitute (i.e., reinterpretation of 
beliefs), and what information they can ignore 
(i.e., discounting of beliefs) about a particular 
attitude object. Suppose, for example, an 
experimenter initially exposed participants to 
a group of people described as imaginative, 
loyal, and skilled. After exposure to this 
group, participants may generate other traits 
such as diligent, strong, and kind to go along 
with their initial beliefs about this group. This 
generation of additional beliefs may result 
from participants accessing a particular 
schema they hold concerning a group of 
people who are imaginative, loyal, and 
skilled.  
 After participants form their initial 
impression of an imaginative, loyal, and 
skilled group of people, an experimenter 
could then define that group of people as 
terrorists. Because this label of terrorists is 
most likely inconsistent with the current 
cognitive schema being used by these 
participants, they must choose between two 
possible options. First, participants may find 
ways to incorporate this terrorist label into 
their schema by reinterpreting initial traits 
(i.e., imaginative, loyal, skilled) to mean that 
this group is passionate about their cause and 
fights for their ideals. Second, participants 
may discount this terrorist label because that 
label does not fit into their current cognitive 
schema about this group. By using a 
particular cognitive schema, individuals may 
generate additional beliefs, reinterpret 
ambiguous beliefs, or discount inconsistent 
beliefs.    
    
 Not everyone holds similar schemas 
concerning an attitude object such as 
terrorism. Therefore, individuals may 
interpret terrorism differently based on their 
level of knowledge (e.g., well-informed vs. 
less-informed) concerning terrorism. 
Individuals who possess well-developed 
schemas should also have a greater potential 
for cognitive change than individuals who 
have less-developed schemas (Tesser, 1978; 
Tesser et al., 1995). That is, individuals with 
well-developed schemas should generate 
additional beliefs, reinterpret ambiguous 
beliefs, and discount inconsistent beliefs more 
readily than individuals with less-developed 
schemas. Individuals, for example, who 
closely watch the United State’s progress in 
the War on Terrorism since September 11, 
2001 via electronic media (i.e., news and 
internet) or paper media (i.e., newspapers and 
magazines) may possess better developed 
schemas of terrorism than individuals who do 
not closely watch the United State’s progress 
in the War on Terrorism since September 11, 
2001. Individuals who think about an attitude 
object using a well-developed schema tend to 
experience greater attitude polarization than 
individuals using a less-developed schema 
(e.g., Leone & Ensley, 1985; Millar & Tesser, 
1986; Tesser & Leone, 1977). Thus, 
individuals’ attitudes concerning terrorism 
could be affected by which type of schema 
(i.e., well-developed vs. less-developed) they 
currently hold about terrorism.    
 Individuals may use different schemas 
to think about the same attitude object 
(Tesser, 1978; Tesser et al., 1995). 
Individuals using different schemas to think 
about an attitude object may experience 
different attitudes about that attitude object. 
Therefore, thought-induced attitude 
polarization is dependent upon the nature of a 
schema an individual “tunes in” for an 
attitude object (e.g., Clary, Tesser & 
Downing, 1978; Tesser & Danheizer, 1978). 
Tesser and Danheiser (1978), for example, 
asked participants to evaluate likeable and 
dislikeable partners. Participants who were 
told they would cooperate with these partners 
evaluated both likeable and dislikeable 
partners more favorably than did participants 
who were told they would compete with these 
partners.  Thus, individuals who believed they 
needed to cooperate with their partners tuned 
in positive schemas for both likeable and 
dislikeable partners, whereas individuals who 
believed they needed to compete with their 
partners tuned in negative schemas for both 
likeable and dislikeable partners. An 
experimenter, for example, shows a group of 
college students the article title “Terrorists 
Bomb Train Station in Switzerland”. It is 
possible that during thought those college 
students may tune in different schemas about 
terrorists depending on those students own 
personal views on terrorism. When tuning in 
different schemas about terrorists, some 
college students may access an unfavorable 
schema and think about extremists who 
purposefully target innocent civilians in an 
attempt to terrorize the world, whereas other 
students may access a favorable schema and 
think about revolutionaries who fight for a 
cause using any means possible. Because 
these college students may tune in different 
schemas about that same attitude object (i.e., 
terrorists), these students may experience 
differences in attitude polarization depending 
which “tuned in” schema they use. 
 Attitude attenuation. Attitude 
polarization is not, however, the only result of 
increased thought (Leone & Aronow, 1992; 
Leone & Baldwin, 1983). Another result of 
increased thought individuals may experience 
is attitude attenuation. During attitude 
attenuation, individuals abandon their beliefs 
about an attitude object thus causing an 
attenuation (i.e., weakening) of attitudes 
supported by those abandoned beliefs (Leone, 
1996; Tesser, 1978). Individuals may 
experience attitude attenuation due to 
situational factors (i.e., cognitive constraints) 
and/or individual factors (i.e., cognitive 
styles). 
 Individuals may experience attitude 
attenuation due to situational factors such as 
cognitive constraints. Individuals are likely to 
experience attitude attenuation when they are 
presented with cognitive constraints prior to 
engaging in thought (Leone & Aronow, 1992; 
    
Leone & Baldwin, 1983; Tesser, Leone, & 
Clary, 1978). There are two types of cognitive 
constraints: reality constraints and process 
constraints.  
 Individuals presented with reality 
constraints (i.e., presence of an attitude object 
during thought) may find that some of their 
beliefs are contradictory with reality (Leone, 
1984; Leone, Taylor, & Adams, 1991; Tesser, 
1976).  Individuals who engage in thought in 
the presence of an attitude object must 
determine if their beliefs about that attitude 
object are accurate (Leone et al., 1991). 
Please recall an earlier example of college 
students who are initially exposed to the 
article title “Terrorists Bomb Train Station in 
Switzerland”. Suppose these college students 
are asked to read this article title and then 
think about that title in an unconstrained 
manner. If, as a result of unconstrained 
thought, these college students activate a 
schema concerning all terrorists being of 
Middle Eastern descent, then these students 
may have polarized attitudes toward 
individuals of Middle Eastern descent. In 
order to introduce a reality constraint to those 
college students’ thought processes, an 
experimenter could familiarize these students 
with a community of Middle Eastern 
individuals living within the United States 
who actively advocate peace. Learning about 
a community of peaceful Middle Eastern 
individuals could introduce a “reality” to 
these college students that not all individuals 
of Middle Eastern descent support violence. 
This “reality” may serve as a constraint to 
those college students’ thoughts. When these 
college students begin thinking in a 
constrained manner, they may be more likely 
to experience attitude attenuation rather than 
attitude polarization.  Attitude attenuation 
may occur because those college students 
discount their belief that all people of Middle 
Eastern descent are terrorists.  
  Individuals presented with process 
constraints (i.e., critically examining a 
derivation of beliefs during thought) often 
discover that some of their beliefs are derived 
from illogical processes or poor inferences 
(Leone, 1996; Leone & Aronow, 1992; 
Tesser, 1978). Please recall an earlier 
example of an experimenter initially exposing 
college students to the article title “Terrorists 
Bomb Train Station in Switzerland” and then 
giving these college students an opportunity 
to think about that article in an unconstrained 
manner. As a result, those college students 
could experience attitude polarization if they 
activate a schema based on beliefs that all 
terrorists are individuals of Middle Eastern 
descent. As a process constraint to these 
college students’ thoughts, an experimenter 
could ask these students to explain their 
beliefs about this article. By thinking about 
and then explicitly verbalizing their reasoning 
about the article “Terrorists Bomb Train 
Station in Switzerland”, those students may 
notice illogical beliefs (e.g., not all terrorists 
are individuals of Middle Eastern descent) 
they are using in their thought processes. 
Once those students recognize their illogical 
beliefs, those students may discount their 
illogical beliefs. Those students may 
experience attitude attenuation because they 
have constrained their illogical beliefs during 
thought. Individuals can reduce (i.e., 
attenuate) effects of unconstrained thought on 
their beliefs when those individuals have 
process constraints introduced to their 
thinking (Leone & Aronow, 1992; Tesser et 
al., 1995). 
 Individuals may experience attitude 
polarization due to individual differences in 
ways these individuals think about an attitude 
object (i.e., person, place, or thing). No two 
individuals think exactly alike. Therefore, 
each individual will think about an attitude 
object in a different way. There are many 
individual differences in thought processing 
including dogmatism, objectivism, and need 
for cognition. 
 Dogmatism is referred to as 
“differences in the nature of belief systems 
which individuals use to simultaneously serve 
as a need to understand the social world and a 
need to protect themselves from potentially 
threatening ideas” (Rokeach, 1960, p. 146). 
That is, individuals use their beliefs in order 
to understand their social world (i.e., people, 
places, and events) in a non-threatening 
    
manner. Individuals may be dogmatic or non-
dogmatic. Dogmatic individuals are 
characterized by a high degree of isolation in 
their beliefs (Rokeach, 1960). Non-dogmatic 
individuals are characterized by a high degree 
of openness in their beliefs (Rokeach, 1960). 
In terms of attitude polarization, dogmatic 
individuals may be more likely than non-
dogmatic individuals to experience attitude 
polarization (Leone, 1989). 
 Objectivism is referred to as a 
“tendency to base one’s judgments and beliefs 
on empirical information and rational 
considerations” (Leary, Shepperd, McNeil, 
Jenkins, & Barnes, 1986, p. 33).  That is, 
some individuals tend to use objective bases 
when forming their opinions and to value both 
reason and logic over intuition when making 
judgments (Leone, 1996). Individuals may be 
objective or non-objective. Objective 
individuals tend to seek out empirical 
information when they are uncertain and 
process that information in a rational fashion 
(Leary et al., 1986). Non-objective 
individuals tend to rely on personal intuition 
when they are uncertain and process 
information in a subjective fashion (Leary et 
al., 1986). In terms of attitude polarization, 
objective individuals may be more likely than 
non-objective individuals to experience 
attitude polarization as opportunity for 
thought increases (Leone, 1996). 
 
Need for Cognition 
 Need for cognition is defined as 
differences in “people’s tendency to engage in 
and enjoy effortful cognitive activity” 
(Cacioppo & Petty, 1982, p. 116). That is, 
individuals vary in their level of motivation to 
engage in and enjoy effortful thinking about a 
particular attitude object (i.e., person, place, 
or thing). Individuals both high and low in 
need for cognition strive to understand their 
world, but they gain this understanding 
through different means (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982, 1984; Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & 
Rodriguez, 1986).  
 Individuals high in need for cognition 
are motivated to engage in effortful thought. 
Individuals high in need for cognition could 
be labeled “chronic cognizers” (i.e., 
motivated thinkers) because these individuals 
enjoy thinking when given an opportunity 
(Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). 
Individuals high in need for cognition tend to 
seek out additional information as well as 
reflect upon information they currently 
possess in order to understand relationships, 
people, and events (Cacioppo et al., 1996). An 
experimenter, for example, may show 
participants high in need for cognition a news 
story concerning Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice discussing Osama Bin 
Laden as a terrorist leader targeting American 
citizens. This experimenter may then ask 
these participants for their opinions about this 
news story. During thought, these individuals 
may recall past occurrences such as the 
Central Intelligence Agency of the United 
States covertly supporting Bin Laden and his 
troops against Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 
Rather than accepting this news story as the 
only source of information about Bin Laden, 
individuals high in need for cognition may 
recall additional related information in order 
to further understand this relationship 
between the United States and Osama Bin 
Ladin.   
 In contrast to individuals high in need 
for cognition, individuals low in need for 
cognition are not motivated to engage in 
effortful thought.  Individuals low in need for 
cognition could be labeled “cognitive misers” 
(i.e., unmotivated thinkers) because these 
individuals only think when absolutely 
necessary (Cacioppo et al., 1996). Individuals 
low in need for cognition tend to rely upon 
others (i.e., experts), heuristics (i.e., 
stereotypes), or social comparisons (e.g., 
similar others) to understand relationships, 
people, and events (Cacioppo et al., 1996).  
An experimenter, for example, may show 
participants low in need for cognition a news 
story concerning Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice discussing Osama Bin 
Ladin as a terrorist leader targeting American 
citizens. This experimenter may then ask 
these participants for their opinion about this 
news story. During thought, these individuals 
may consider Condoleezza Rice an expert on 
    
terrorism and agree with her that Bin Ladin is 
indeed a terrorist leader who targets American 
citizens. Rather than engaging in further 
thought about this information, individuals 
low in need for cognition may simply accept 
this information as valid because an expert 
presented this information.  
 Individuals who differ in need for 
cognition also vary in amounts of information 
they are able to recall. Researchers have 
shown that individuals high in need for 
cognition are better able than are individuals 
low in need for cognition to recall information 
to which those individuals are exposed (e.g., 
Cacioppo, Petty, & Morris, 1983). Cacioppo 
and his colleagues instructed participants to 
read articles containing either six strong or six 
weak arguments in favor of comprehensive 
college graduation exams. Regardless of 
argument quality (i.e., strong vs. weak 
arguments), participants high in need for 
cognition recalled nearly two thirds of all 
arguments whereas participants low in need 
for cognition recalled roughly half of all 
arguments. Other researchers have replicated 
these findings that individuals high in need 
for cognition recall more information than do 
individuals low in need for cognition (e.g., 
Lassiter, Briggs, & Bowman, 1991; Meyers-
Levy & Peracchio, 1992).  
 Individuals who differ in need for 
cognition also vary in their use of routes to 
persuasion. Individuals high in need for 
cognition tend to use a central (i.e., 
systematic) route in order to think about a 
particular task, whereas individuals low in 
need for cognition tend to use a peripheral 
(i.e., superficial) route in order to think about 
a particular task (Cacioppo et al., 1996). In 
other words, high need for cognition 
individuals will elaborate on a task during 
thought thereby using a central route to 
persuasion, whereas low need for cognition 
individuals will only engage in superficial 
thought about a task thereby using a 
peripheral route to persuasion. This 
systematic versus superficial thought 
processing is a foundation for other 
differences between individuals high in need 
for cognition and individuals low in need for 
cognition.  
 For example, individuals who differ in 
need for cognition vary in their 
responsiveness to argument quality. 
Researchers have shown that individuals (i.e., 
high need for cognition) who think about and 
elaborate upon persuasive arguments tend to 
base their attitudes on argument quality more 
so than do individuals (i.e., low need for 
cognition) who think about those persuasive 
arguments in a superficial manner (e.g., 
Cacioppo et al., 1983; Petty, Wells, & Brock, 
1976). Cacioppo et al. (1983) conducted 
research in which participants read a 
persuasive message containing either four 
strong arguments or four weak arguments. 
These researchers found that individuals high 
in need for cognition based their attitudes 
about that message on the quality (i.e., strong 
vs. weak) of those arguments more often than 
did individuals low in need for cognition. 
Other researchers have replicated these 
findings in which individuals high in need for 
cognition more so than individuals low in 
need for cognition base their attitudes toward 
persuasive messages on argument quality 
(e.g., Axsom, Yates, & Chaiken, 1987; 
Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992; Priester & Petty, 
1995).  
 Individuals who differ in need for 
cognition also vary in their responsiveness to 
peripheral cues (i.e., superficial information). 
According to researchers utilizing the 
elaboration likelihood model (e.g., Cialdini, 
Petty, & Caccioppo, 1981) and the heuristic-
systematic model (e.g., Chaiken, Liberman, & 
Eagly, 1989), if individuals are unmotivated 
or unable to think in a thorough manner about 
information within a persuasive message, then 
those individuals may be influenced by 
peripheral cues within that message. Because 
individuals high in need for cognition are 
motivated to think about information 
thoroughly, they should be less susceptible to 
peripheral cues than should individuals low in 
need for cognition. Individuals low in need 
for cognition, more so than individuals high 
in need for cognition, show evidence of 
influence from peripheral cues in research 
    
studies involving expertise and attractiveness 
of message source (e.g., Petty, Cacioppo, & 
Goldman, 1981), number of arguments 
contained within a message (e.g., Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1984), and merely stating number 
of arguments to be given (e.g., Chaiken, 
Axsom, & Yates, 1987; Haugtvedt et al., 
1992).  
 Individuals who differ in need for 
cognition also vary in number of thoughts 
generated during cognitive tasks. Several 
researchers have reported that individuals 
high in need for cognition generate additional 
thoughts that are relevant to their cognitive 
tasks more so than do individuals low in need 
for cognition (e.g., Axsom et al., 1987; 
Haugtvedt et al., 1992). Not all researchers, 
however, have reached similar conclusions 
about thought generation from individuals 
high in need for cognition. Some researchers 
maintain that individuals do not display 
differences in need for cognition by means of 
listing overall number of task-relevant 
thoughts but rather by generating thoughts 
that reflect overall argument quality (e.g., 
Bodenhausen, 1988; Priester & Petty, 1995). 
These researchers maintain that individuals 
high in need for cognition not only generate a 
greater number of thoughts than do 
individuals low in need for cognition but also 
generate thoughts which are reflective of 
argument quality.  
 Individuals who differ in need for 
cognition also vary in connections of beliefs 
with judgments. In other words, if individuals 
make carefully considered judgments, then 
those judgments should reflect the beliefs 
held by those individuals (Cacioppo et al., 
1996). Several researchers have found that 
individuals high in need for cognition more so 
than individuals low in need for cognition 
form judgments that are based on those 
individuals’ beliefs (e.g., Haugtvedt et al., 
1992; Verplanken, 1989). Other researchers 
maintain that initial attitudes (i.e., judgments) 
and amount of thought are correlated in 
individuals high in need for cognition, 
whereas initial attitudes (i.e., judgments) and 
amount of thought are not correlated in 
individuals low in need for cognition (e.g., 
Hastie & Park, 1986; Haugtvedt et al., 1992; 
Verplanken, 1989). 
 Individuals who differ in need for 
cognition also vary in amounts of knowledge 
possessed. That is, individuals (i.e., high in 
need for cognition) who actively seek out and 
process information are more likely to have a 
greater amount of stored knowledge than are 
those individuals (i.e., low in need for 
cognition) who do not actively seek out and 
process information (Cacioppo et al., 1996). 
Researchers have gathered evidence that 
individuals high in need for cognition more so 
than individuals low in need for cognition 
possess greater amounts of knowledge about 
presidential candidates (Cacioppo et al., 
1986), types of birds (Martin, Ward, Achee, 
& Wyer, 1993), and trivial test questions 
(Wolfe & Grosch, 1990). Overall, individuals 
high in need for cognition often possess a 
greater knowledge base than do individuals 
low in need for cognition (Cacioppo et al., 
1996). 
 Individuals who differ in their need 
for cognition may also vary in their use of 
stereotypes. According to Snyder and Miene 
(1994), stereotypes are over-generalized 
beliefs about various members of social 
categories (e.g., African Americans, women, 
or terrorists). Rather than having individual 
attributes and expected behaviors, these social 
category members are given a shared set of 
attributes and expected behaviors. Individuals 
using stereotypes are able to ignore individual 
characteristics of a member in a social 
category by seeing that member as part of a 
generalized group. Snyder and Miene also 
state that individuals may use stereotypes as 
cognitive economizers in a sense that, by 
using stereotypes, individuals can reduce 
incoming information to a manageable size.  
 In this cognitive view, stereotyping 
plays a similar role to that of schemas in self-
generated attitude change. Individuals use 
schemas in order to reduce cognitive effort 
when thinking about an attitude object (i.e., 
person, place, or thing). If individuals use 
stereotypes in order to reduce their cognitive 
load during thought, then it is possible that 
    
these individuals may use stereotypes in a 
similar fashion as they use schemas. 
        Do individuals differing in need for 
cognition (i.e., high vs. low) vary in their use 
of stereotypes? Some researchers (e.g., 
Cacioppo et al., 1996; Kawakami, Dovidio, 
Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000; Waller, 
1993) have found that individuals high or low 
in need for cognition both use stereotypes 
when thinking about an attitude object. 
However, those individuals (i.e., high vs. low 
need for cognition) differ in how they use 
stereotypes. In two recent studies, researchers 
have found individual differences in 
stereotyping based on differences in 
participants’ need for cognition (Crawford & 
Skowronski, 1998; Perlini & Hansen, 2001).  
 In a study on information recall, 
Crawford and Skowronski (1998) asked 
participants to recall both stereotype-
consistent and stereotype-inconsistent 
personality traits of individuals in the 
presence of or absence of an occupational 
label. These researchers found that 
individuals high in need for cognition were 
able to recall more stereotype-consistent traits 
than were individuals low in need for 
cognition when traits were presented with an 
occupational label. In a no occupational label 
condition, however, there were no significant 
differences between individuals high or low 
in need for cognition in recall of trait 
information. Crawford and Skowronski found 
that not only did individuals high in need for 
cognition recall more trait information than 
individuals low in need for cognition but also 
that individuals high in need for cognition 
also used stereotypes (i.e., schemas) more so 
than did individuals low in need for cognition 
in order to recall that trait information. 
 In their study on responsiveness to 
peripheral cues, Perlini and Hansen (2001) 
asked participants to give attractiveness 
ratings of several photos. These researchers 
found that although both high and low need 
for cognition individuals exhibited use of 
attractiveness stereotyping, individuals low in 
need for cognition gave more favorable 
ratings to attractive photos than to 
unattractive photos. In this study, individuals 
low in need for cognition more so than 
individuals high in need for cognition were 
affected by attractiveness (i.e., peripheral 
cues). This difference in attractiveness ratings 
may be due to high need for cognition 
individuals showing a preference toward a 
central route of thinking (Perlini & Hansen, 
2001). Although high need for cognition 
individuals did use attractiveness stereotypes, 
they did not rely on those stereotypes as 
heavily as did low need for cognition 
individuals; therefore, it is likely that high 
need for cognition individuals engaged in 
additional elaborative thought about those 
photographs. 
 Researchers from these two studies 
have provided somewhat contradictory 
findings concerning effects of individual 
differences in need for cognition on 
stereotyping. In one study, researchers 
observed that individuals high in need for 
cognition used stereotypes more often than 
did individuals low in need for cognition 
(Crawford & Skowronski, 1998). In another 
study, researchers observed that individuals 
low in need for cognition used stereotypes 
more often than did individuals high in need 
for cognition (Perlini & Hansen, 2001). 
 To summarize, individuals who differ 
in need for cognition also vary in their 
enjoyment of thinking, their tendency to 
engage in tasks which require active thought, 
and their motivation to acquire additional 
information (Cacioppo et al., 1996). 
Individuals high in need for cognition enjoy 
thinking about attitude objects (i.e., people, 
places, and things), engage in active thinking 
during tasks, and are motivated to seek out 
additional information about attitude objects. 
In contrast, individuals low in need for 
cognition think only as much as necessary 
about attitude objects, complete tasks without 
engaging in active thought, and are not 
motivated to seek out additional information 
about attitude objects.  
 Individuals differing in need for 
cognition (i.e., high vs. low need for 
cognition) also vary in the amount of 
cognitive activity (i.e., information recall, 
responsiveness to peripheral cues, and 
    
correlation of thoughts and judgments) in 
which they engage (Cacioppo et al., 1996). 
High need for cognition and low need for 
cognition individuals also vary in their use of 
stereotypes (i.e., attractiveness cues, 
stereotype-consistency) when engaged in 
thought (Crawford & Skowronski, 1998; 
Perlini & Hansen, 2001). Individuals may use 
stereotypes as a means of reducing incoming 
information to a manageable size (Snyder & 
Miene, 1994). This idea of information 
reduction via stereotypes is similar to that of 
schema use in self-generated attitude change. 
It is possible, therefore, that individuals differ 
in their use of schemas (i.e., stereotyping) 
based on individual differences in need for 
cognition. Individuals high in need for 
cognition should rely on stereotypes less often 
than should individuals low in need for 
cognition when thinking about attitude 
objects. 
 
Hypotheses 
 We predict that individuals will have 
greater levels of attitude polarization when 
given high opportunity rather than low 
opportunity for thought. We also predict that 
this effect of opportunity for thought will be 
affected by several other variables. 
Individuals will have greater attitude 
polarization if they possess well-developed 
rather than less-developed schemas when 
thinking about groups of people and if their 
well-developed schemas are consistent rather 
than inconsistent with information about those 
groups. Additionally, those effects of 
opportunity for thought, type of schema, and 
schema consistency will be more evident in 
individuals low in need for cognition rather 
than individuals high in need for cognition. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 A total of 151 students were recruited 
from undergraduate psychology courses. 
Students volunteered to participate in a study 
titled “Individual Differences in Perceptions 
of Groups”. In exchange for participation, 
students received extra credit toward a course 
grade. 
 A total of 21 males and 130 females 
participated in this study. A majority (65 %) 
of the sample was Caucasian. Most 
participants (57 %) were between 18 and 22 
years of age.  
 A male experimenter randomly 
assigned all participants to experimental 
groups. He obtained written informed consent 
from all participants. Of all participants who 
volunteered for this study, only three did not 
complete the experimental procedure, and 
therefore their data was excluded from this 
study. All participants were treated in 
accordance with the Ethical Principles of 
Psychologists and Code of Conduct 
(American Psychological Association, 2003). 
 
Procedure 
 A male experimenter greeted each 
participant in a hallway outside of a 
laboratory and interviewed each participant in 
an individual research room throughout this 
study. He described the general purpose of his 
research (i.e., studying college students’ 
attitudes toward groups and how individuals 
thought about themselves as well as others). 
After explaining his study’s general purpose, 
he obtained informed consent in writing from 
each participant. 
 He then informed participants that the 
first portion of his study would involve 
forming impressions of groups. He presented 
an example group descriptor card that was 
similar to group descriptor cards used in his 
study. He had four separate attributes listed 
on this example group descriptor card (e.g., 
perceptive, ordinary, visual, and over-
bearing).  He explained to each participant 
that although it would be easy for them to 
view each group descriptor set as describing 
an individual, it was very important for them 
to keep in mind that he was describing groups 
of people in these descriptor sets. 
 After presenting this example group 
descriptor card, the experimenter informed 
participants that they would respond with 
their initial impressions of groups using a 15-
point scale. He placed this scale on a desk 
directly in front of each participant. Endpoints 
on this scale were labeled “very favorable 
    
impression” (+7) and “very unfavorable 
impression” (-7) and a midpoint was labeled 
“neutral” (0). Intermediate points (e.g., +4, -
4) were labeled as “moderately favorable” 
and “moderately unfavorable” respectively. 
He asked participants to provide him with 
their initial impressions of the example group 
descriptor card using this 15-point scale. After 
participants rated their initial impression of 
the example group descriptor, the 
experimenter asked if they had any questions 
concerning this procedure before continuing 
with his experiment. 
 Participants were then presented with 
30 separate group descriptor sets on 12.7 x 
20.3 cm. cards. There were four separate 
attributes (e.g., talented, independent, 
unconventional, and humorous) on each 
group descriptor card. The experimenter 
designed 15 group descriptor cards to have 
three negative attributes and one neutral 
attribute (e.g., authoritative, unintelligent, 
mediocre, and resentful) and 15 group 
descriptor cards to have three positive 
attributes and one neutral attribute (e.g., 
imaginative, loyal, inhibited, and skilled). The 
experimenter chose all group attributes used 
in his study from research by Norman 
Anderson (1968) who developed a definitive 
list of 555 personality-trait words that were 
rated on likableness.    
After they read each group descriptor, 
participants were told to indicate their initial 
feelings towards that group by saying aloud a 
number on the 15-point scale that best 
represented their initial feelings. The 
experimenter prompted participants every 10 
seconds to ensure an equal amount of time 
was used in consideration of initial feelings 
towards each group descriptor. He recorded 
participants’ verbal responses on a separate 
sheet to ensure that initial ratings remained 
inaccessible to participants. 
 Upon receiving participants’ responses 
to the last group descriptor card, the 
experimenter chose two group descriptor 
cards to which participants expressed 
moderately favorable impressions (i.e., ratings 
of +4) and two group descriptor cards to 
which participants expressed moderately 
unfavorable impressions (i.e., ratings of -4). If 
participants provided only one or no moderate 
impressions (i.e., +4 or –4), then the 
experimenter chose those participants’ next 
closest impression score (i.e., +3 or -3).  
 Prior to showing participants one of 
the four group descriptor cards, the 
experimenter randomly assigned some 
participants to be informed either that groups 
described in the following cards were 
Freedom Fighters or that groups described in 
the following cards were Rebel Insurgents. 
After making participants aware of the 
assigned groups, he asked them to provide 
him with their own definitions of those groups 
(i.e., Freedom Fighters or Rebel Insurgents). 
He did so in order to see if participants 
understood what these group labels meant. 
After listening to participants’ responses, the 
experimenter provided all participants with 
one of two pre-determined descriptions 
depending upon group assignment. For 
Freedom Fighters, participants were given an 
example of South American fighters 
attempting to overthrow a country’s 
dictatorship and establish a democracy. For 
Rebel Insurgents, participants were given an 
example of South American fighters 
attempting to overthrow a country’s 
democracy and establish a dictatorship. 
Following each group description (i.e., 
Freedom Fighters or Rebel Insurgents), 
participants were instructed  
  
 “…I’d like you to take some time to 
think about one of these descriptions. I 
want  you to concentrate all of your 
thoughts on this [group] during the time 
I give you. You might want to think 
about how you feel about a [group] with 
these characteristics. You might want to 
think about [groups] you know that fit 
this description. Or you might want to 
think about what other qualities and 
traits [groups] like this may have. Just 
concentrate on this description and 
continue  thinking until I tell you to 
stop…” (Leone, 1996, p. 385). 
 
    
The experimenter then briefly displayed one 
of the four pre-selected group descriptor cards 
to participants and provided those participants 
with an opportunity to think about the group 
being described. Participants were randomly 
assigned to either low (i.e., 45 sec.) or high 
(i.e., 90 sec.) opportunity for thought 
conditions. Opportunity for thought 
conditions (45 sec. vs. 90 sec.) were taken 
from prior research in which investigators 
measured self-generated attitude change (see 
Leone et al., 1991). 
 After thinking about the group 
descriptor card shown, participants re-rated 
their impression of that group. Specifically, 
participants were instructed 
 
“Now that you’ve had a chance to collect 
your thoughts, I’d like you to once again 
indicate how you feel. Sometimes 
people’s feelings change even over a 
short period of time as this. Of course, 
you may or may not feel the same way 
about the [group]. Using the scale as 
before, indicate how you feel about the 
[group] now.” (Leone, 1996, p. 385). 
 
The experimenter presented a 15-point scale 
to participants who then stated aloud a 
number that best represented their feelings. 
He recorded participants’ verbal responses on 
a separate sheet to ensure that these ratings 
remained inaccessible to participants. He 
repeated this same procedure for the 
remaining three group descriptor sets. 
 The experimenter measured attitude 
polarization by the following means (cf., 
Tesser, 1978). If a moderately favorable (+4) 
impression became more favorable (i.e., +5, 
+6, or +7) or a moderately unfavorable (-4) 
impression became more unfavorable (i.e., -5, 
-6, or -7) following a period of thought, then 
he assigned attitude change (i.e., attitude 
polarization) a score of “+1”. If an initial 
impression did not change following a period 
of thought, then he assigned attitude change a 
score of “0”. He assigned all other participant 
responses (i.e., attitude attenuation) a score of 
“-1”. Scores were summed across all four 
descriptions with a higher total score 
indicating more thought-induced attitude 
polarization. 
 Upon completion of all thought tasks, 
the experimenter presented participants with a 
survey titled Individual Differences in 
Cognitive Styles containing the 18-item Need 
for Cognition Scale which was used to assess 
individual differences in need for cognition 
(Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984). Participants 
used a 5-point scale with response options 
labeled strongly disagree, disagree, 
undecided, agree, and strongly agree to 
respond to statements in the Need for 
Cognition Scale. Half of the statements within 
the scale were written such that agreement 
indicated a high need for cognition (e.g., “I 
would prefer complex to simple problems”) 
and half of the statements were written such 
that disagreement indicated a high need for 
cognition (e.g., “I only think as hard as I have 
to”). 
 Participant’s responses to statements 
in which disagreement indicated high need for 
cognition were reversed scored. Answers to 
each of the 18 items on this scale were scored 
such that a higher overall score was indicative 
of a higher need for cognition. The 
experimenter classified participants as either 
high or low in need for cognition based on a 
median split of overall scores. There were 76 
participants categorized as high in need for 
cognition and 75 participants classified as low 
in need for cognition.  
In terms of internal consistency, 
several researchers found Cronbach’s alphas 
of .85 or more for scores on the Need for 
Cognition Scale (e.g., Berzonsky & Sullivan, 
1992; Leary, Sheppard, McNeil, Jenkins, & 
Barnes, 1986). During a seven week testing 
period, Sadowski and Gulgoz (1992) found a 
test-retest correlation of .88 for scores on the 
Need for Cognition Scale. In the current 
sample, the experimenter obtained a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .96 for scores on the 
Need for Cognition Scale. 
Researchers have conducted studies in 
which they provide evidence of convergent 
validity for scores on the Need for Cognition 
Scale. There were positive correlations 
between scores on the Need for Cognition 
    
Scale and scores on the following measures: 
attention given to tasks (e.g., Osberg, 1987), 
information seeking and usage in problem 
solving (e.g., Berzonsky & Sullivan, 1992), 
and motivation for experiences that are 
thought provoking (e.g., Venkatraman & 
Price, 1990). Researchers have conducted 
studies in which they provide evidence of 
discriminant validity for scores on the Need 
for Cognition Scale. There was a lack of 
correlation between scores on the Need for 
Cognition Scale and scores on the following 
measures: dogmatism (e.g., Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1982), need for closure (e.g., Petty & 
Jarvis, 1996), and preference for order (e.g., 
Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Researchers 
have shown construct validity for scores on 
the Need for Cognition Scale in studies of 
information recall (e.g., Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982; Lassiter, Briggs, & Bowman, 1991), 
responsiveness to argument quality (e.g., 
Cacioppo, Kao, Petty, & Rodriguez, 1989; 
Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976), and 
responsiveness to peripheral cues (e.g., 
Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1981). 
  The experimenter included four 
questions at the end of his survey in order to 
assess participants’ demographic information. 
Participants were first asked to indicate their 
age with response options labeled 18-22, 23-
27, 28-32, 33-37, 38 or older. They were next 
asked to indicate their sex with response 
options labeled male or female. They were 
asked to indicate their race with response 
options labeled African-American/Black, 
Caucasian/White, Hispanic, Asian, or Other. 
Participants were last asked to indicate their 
political affiliation with response options 
labeled Democrat, Republican, or 
Independent.            Upon completion of the 
demographic section of his survey, the 
experimenter asked each participant a series a 
questions to serve as a manipulation check for 
this study. He asked each participant six 
questions during each post-experiment 
interview. Some questions concerned detailed 
portions of the study (i.e., What types of 
groups did you think of? Why?), and other 
questions concerned the study as a whole (i.e., 
What did you think we were looking at in this 
study?). After completing the post-experiment 
interview, all participants were debriefed as to 
the purpose of this study. 
 
Results 
Overview of Analyses 
 This study was a 2 (opportunity for 
thought: high vs. low) x 2 (group type: 
freedom fighters vs. rebel insurgents) x 2 
(need for cognition: low vs. high need) x 2 
(initial attitude: positive vs. negative) factorial 
design with repeated measures on the last 
factor. The dependent variable in this study 
was attitude polarization. All participants 
scores on attitude polarization were analyzed 
using a 2 (opportunity for thought) x 2 (group 
type) x 2 (need for cognition) x 2 (initial 
attitude) analysis of variance (ANOVA).  
 
Main Analyses 
 It was hypothesized that individuals 
would experience greater attitude polarization 
when they were given a high opportunity for 
thought rather than a low opportunity for 
thought. It was also hypothesized that when 
individuals thought about a group (i.e., 
freedom fighters or rebel insurgents), those 
individuals would experience greater attitude 
polarization if their schemas were consistent 
(e.g., freedom fighters) rather than 
inconsistent (e.g., rebel insurgents) with 
descriptions of those groups (e.g., initially 
positive attributes). Finally, it was 
hypothesized that effects of opportunity for 
thought, group type, and initial attitude on 
attitude polarization would be more evident 
for individuals low in need for cognition than 
for individuals high in need for cognition. 
 In order for our first hypothesis to be 
supported, we would expect to find a main 
effect for opportunity for thought. Our second 
hypothesis would be supported by a three-
way interaction between opportunity for 
thought, group type, and initial attitude. Our 
final hypothesis would be supported by a 
four-way interaction between opportunity for 
thought, group type, initial attitude, and need 
for cognition.  
    
 Contrary to our hypotheses, there was 
no significant main effect for opportunity for 
thought on attitude polarization, F(1, 143) = 
2.09, p < .15. Individuals did not show 
significant differences in attitude polarization 
when given high opportunity for thought (M = 
.28, SD = 1.46) rather than low opportunity 
for thought (M = .48, SD = 1.36). There was 
also no significant three-way interaction 
between opportunity for thought, group type, 
and initial affect, F < 1.00 (see Table 1). 
During high opportunity for thought, 
individuals who had schemas about a group 
that were consistent with those individuals’ 
initial attitudes did not experience more 
attitude polarization than did individuals who 
had schemas about a group that were 
inconsistent with initial attitudes. There was a 
similar absence of attitude polarization with 
individuals given low opportunity for thought 
in the same schema conditions.
 
Table 1.Effects of Attitude Polarization in Opportunity for Thought x Group Type x Initial Attitude 
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 
 Opportunity for Thought 
Group Type Low High 
 M SD M SD 
Freedom Fighters 
 Positive Attitude 92 0.99 .78 1.27 
 Negative Attitude .60 1.34 .39 1.44 
 
Rebel Insurgents 
 Positive Attitude -.12 1.45 -.47 1.23 
 Negative Attitude .54 1.41 .39 1.61 
 
There was also no significant four-way 
interaction between opportunity for thought, 
group type, initial affect, and need for 
cognition, F < 1.00 (see Table 2). During 
either a low or a high opportunity for thought, 
individuals low in need for cognition who had 
schemas about a group that were consistent 
with those individuals’ initial attitudes did not 
experience more attitude polarization than did 
individuals who had schemas about a group 
that were inconsistent with initial attitudes. 
There was a similar absence of attitude 
polarization with high need for cognition 
individuals in both high and low opportunity 
for thought conditions.  
 
Table 2.  Effects of Attitude Polarization in Opportunity for Thought x Group Type x Initial 
Attitude x Need for Cognition Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
 
Low Need for Cognition 
 Opportunity for Thought 
Group Type Low High 
 M SD M SD 
Freedom Fighters 
Positive Attitude .95 .88 .47 1.46 
Negative Attitude .85 1.30 -.05 1.63 
 
Rebel Insurgents 
 Positive Attitude 0.0 1.49 -.40 1.27 
 Negative Attitude .44 1.50 .35 1.53 
    
High Need for Cognition 
 Opportunity for Thought 
Group Type Low High 
 M SD M SD 
Freedom Fighters 
 Positive Attitude .89 1.13 1.05 1.07 
 Negative Attitude .33 1.37 0.76 1.17 
 
Rebel Insurgents 
 Positive Attitude -.23 1.44 -0.56 1.21 
 Negative Attitude .62 1.36 .044 1.75 
 
Although not predicted, there was a reliable 
main effect for group type (i.e., freedom 
fighters vs. rebel insurgents) on attitude 
polarization. Individuals experienced greater 
attitude polarization when thinking about 
groups of freedom fighters (M = 1.36, SD = 
1.80) than when thinking about groups of 
rebel insurgents (M = 0.17, SD = 2.03),  
F(1, 143) = 13.57, p < .01. This main effect 
was qualified by a two-way interaction 
between group type and individuals’ initial 
attitudes, F(1, 143) = 12.77, p < .01. 
Individuals experienced greater attitude 
polarization when they had initially positive 
attitudes and thought about freedom fighters 
(M = 0.85, SD = 1.14) than when those 
individuals had initially negative attitudes and 
thought about freedom fighters (M = 0.50, SD 
= 1.39). Additionally, individuals experienced 
greater attitude polarization when they had 
initially negative attitudes and thought about 
rebel insurgents (M = 0.47, SD = 1.51) than 
when those individuals had initially positive 
attitudes and thought about rebel insurgents 
(M = -0.29, SD = 1.35). In short, individuals 
showed more attitude polarization when 
schemas about a group were consistent with 
initial attitudes about that group than when 
schemas about a group were inconsistent with 
initial attitudes. 
 
Secondary Analyses    
 At the end of this experiment, the 
researcher asked participants to indicate what 
groups they thought about during their 
opportunity for thought. Approximately 94% 
of participants in this sample indicated they 
were able to think about some group of 
people (i.e., freedom fighters or rebel 
insurgents) during assigned periods of 
thought. Of all participants, 41% of 
participants indicated a specific group (e.g., 
Al Qaeda), whereas 53% of participants 
indicated a non-specific group (e.g., 
terrorists).  
 In order to examine the possibility that 
group specificity (i.e., specific vs. non-
specific) might be confounded with other 
factors, we evaluated our data using chi-
square analyses. We conducted three chi-
square analyses looking for relationships 
between group specificity and the following 
factors: group type, need for cognition, and 
opportunity for thought. In this sample, we 
found no relationship between group 
specificity and group type, X2 (1, N = 142) = 
1.45, p < .23, participants’ need for cognition, 
X2 (1, N =142) = 1.95, p < .16, or opportunity 
for thought, X2 < 1.00. In short, group 
specificity was not confounded with other 
factors in this experiment. 
 In order to explore a relationship 
between group specificity and attitude 
polarization, a one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted. In this analysis, 
group specificity was our criterion variable 
and attitude polarization was our predictor 
variable. There was a significant effect for 
group specificity in terms of individuals’ 
attitude polarization, F(1, 140) = 3.83, p < 
.05. Individuals who were able to imagine 
specific groups of freedom fighters or rebel 
insurgents tended to show more attitude 
polarization (M = 1.11, SD = 1.93) than did 
    
individuals who were able to imagine only 
non-specific groups of freedom fighters or 
rebel insurgents (M = 0.46, SD = 1.99) (see 
Figure 1). For example, individuals who 
imagined specific groups of rebel insurgents 
(e.g., Al Qaeda) during thought had stronger 
feelings about those groups than individuals 
who imagined non-specific groups (e.g., 
terrorists). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Effects of Group Type and Initial Attitude on Attitude Polarization 
 
Having established a relationship 
between group specificity and attitude 
polarization, further analysis of group 
specificity (i.e., specific vs. general groups) 
was conducted in the form of a 2 (opportunity 
for thought) x 2 (need for cognition) x 2 
(group type) x 2 (initial attitude) x 2 (group 
specificity) analysis of variance (ANOVA). In 
this analysis, opportunity for thought, need 
for cognition, initial attitude, and group 
specificity were the predictor variables. The 
criterion variable in this analysis was attitude 
polarization. There was no significant four-
way interaction between opportunity for 
thought, need for cognition, group type, and 
group specificity, F < 1.00. During either a 
low or a high opportunity for thought, 
individuals low in need for cognition who had 
schemas about a group that were specific in 
nature (e.g., Al Qaeda) did not experience 
more attitude polarization than did individuals  
 
 
 
who had schemas about a group that were 
general in nature (e.g., terrorists). There was a 
similar absence of attitude polarization with 
high need for cognition individuals in both 
high and low opportunity for thought 
conditions. 
 We did, however, find a significant 
two-way interaction between opportunity for 
thought and group specificity, F(1, 141) = 
4.38, p < .05. When individuals thought about 
a specific group (e.g., Al Qaeda), they 
experienced more attitude polarization when 
given low opportunity for thought (M = 1.61, 
SD = 1.54) rather than when given high 
opportunity for thought (M = .61, SD = 2.16). 
However, when individuals thought about a 
general group (e.g., terrorists), they did not 
experience significantly different amounts of 
attitude polarization when given low 
opportunity for thought (M = .46, SD = 2.13) 
than when given high opportunity for thought 
(M = .46, SD = 1.89) (see Figure 2).  
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Figure 2.  Effects of Opportunity for Thought and Group Specificity on Attitude Polarization 
 
 
Discussion 
  
We predicted that individuals would 
have more attitude polarization when given 
high opportunity rather than low opportunity 
for thought. We also predicted that 
individuals would have greater attitude 
polarization if they possessed well-developed 
rather than less-developed schemas when 
thinking about groups of people and if their 
well-developed schemas were consistent 
rather than inconsistent with information 
about those groups. Additionally,… those 
effects of opportunity for thought, type of 
schema, and schema consistency would be 
more evident in individuals low in need for 
cognition rather than individuals high in need 
for cognition. 
 As expected, attitude polarization did 
depend on type of schema individuals “tuned 
in” and whether that schema was consistent or 
inconsistent with those individuals’ initial 
attitudes. In this study, we found increasing 
amounts of attitude polarization during 
thought when individuals had well-developed 
schemas about a particular group than when 
individuals had less-developed schemas about 
a particular group. Additionally, we found  
 
 
 
increasing amounts of attitude polarization 
during thought if those individuals’ well- 
developed schemas were consistent with 
group descriptions (e.g., positive initial  
attitudes associated with freedom fighters) 
than if those individuals’ well-developed 
schemas were inconsistent with group 
descriptions (e.g., negative initial attitudes 
associated with freedom fighters). Therefore, 
attitude polarization did depend on whether 
individuals engaged in thought using well-
developed rather than less-developed schemas 
and whether those schemas were consistent or 
inconsistent with those individuals’ initial 
attitudes.  
 Attitude polarization did not vary 
depending on individuals’ opportunity for 
thought and differences in need for cognition. 
In this study, we did not find increasing 
amounts of attitude polarization with 
increasing opportunity for thought. 
Additionally, we did not find a higher amount 
of attitude polarization in low need for 
cognition individuals than in high need for 
cognition individuals. Therefore, attitude 
polarization did not depend on whether an 
individual was given a high or low 
opportunity for thought or whether an 
individual was high or low in need for 
cognition.      
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Support for attitude polarization. 
 We found partial support for our 
hypotheses concerning schema complexity 
(i.e., well-developed vs. less-developed 
schemas) and schema consistency (i.e., initial 
attitudes: positive vs. negative). In our study, 
we asked participants to tell us which groups 
of freedom fighters or rebel insurgents they 
thought about during their opportunity for 
thought. Our participants’ gave us answers 
ranging from general group names to specific 
group names for both freedom fighters (e.g., 
soldiers vs. American armed forces) and rebel 
insurgents (e.g., terrorists vs. Al Qaeda). In 
terms of schema complexity, we found that 
amount of attitude polarization experienced 
by individuals was dependent upon whether 
those individuals had a well-developed (e.g., 
American armed forces) or less-developed 
(e.g., soldiers) schema about groups of people 
(e.g., freedom fighters). Individuals 
possessing well-developed schemas about 
groups showed greater attitude polarization 
than did individuals possessing less-
developed schemas about groups. Additional 
researchers have found that individuals will 
experience greater attitude polarization when 
they possess well-developed rather than less-
developed schemas (e.g., Leone & Ensley, 
1985; Millar & Tesser, 1986).    
 In our study, if individuals “tuned in” 
a schema about a specific group of freedom 
fighters or rebel insurgents (e.g., American 
armed forces or Al Qaeda), then they 
experienced greater attitude polarization than 
did those individuals that “tuned in” a schema 
about a general group of freedom fighters or 
rebel insurgents (e.g., soldiers or terrorists). 
Other researchers have shown that individuals 
varied in the amount of attitude polarization 
they experienced depending on the nature of 
the schema those individuals “tuned in” when 
thinking about a particular attitude object 
(e.g., groups of people) (Clary, Tesser, 
Downing, 1978; Tesser & Danheizer, 1978). 
 In support of our schema consistency 
(i.e., initial attitudes) hypothesis, we found 
that individuals experienced more attitude 
polarization when they “tuned in” schemas 
that were consistent with their initial attitudes 
about a group of people than when they 
“tuned in” schemas that were inconsistent 
with their initial attitudes about a group of 
people. When individuals held initial positive 
attitudes and thought about freedom fighters, 
they experienced more attitude polarization 
than when those individuals had initially 
negative attitudes and thought about freedom 
fighters. Likewise, when individuals held 
initially negative attitudes and thought about 
rebel insurgents, they experienced more 
attitude polarization than when those 
individuals had initially positive attitudes and 
thought about rebel insurgents. In other 
words, when individuals’ initial attitudes were 
consistent with schemas they “tuned in” about 
a group of people, those individuals 
experienced more attitude polarization than 
when their initial attitudes were inconsistent 
with schemas they “tuned in” about a group 
of people. 
 We did not find support for our 
hypotheses concerning opportunity for 
thought. We found that when individuals were 
given a high opportunity for thought, they 
tended to attenuate their attitudes rather than 
polarize their attitudes. When individuals 
were given a low opportunity for thought, 
they tended to polarize their attitudes rather 
than attenuate their attitudes. These 
attenuation effects shown by individuals 
given high opportunity for thought were 
opposite our prediction for opportunity for 
thought.  
 One possible explanation for a lack of 
attitude polarization and a trend toward 
attitude attenuation in our participants may be 
an inadvertent introduction of cognitive 
constraints in our study. There may have been 
something in our procedure that induced 
either reality constraints or process constraints 
to the thought processes of our participants. 
Recall that a reality constraint is the presence 
of an attitude object during thought and a 
process constraint is the critical examination 
of beliefs during thought (Leone, Taylor, & 
Adams, 1991; Leone & Aronow, 1992). 
When individuals have a reality or process 
constraint imposed during thought, they are 
more likely to attenuate their attitudes rather 
    
than to polarize their attitudes (Leone et al., 
1991). It is unlikely, however, that attitude 
attenuation effects seen in our study were due 
to cognitive constraints. Attitude attenuation 
was unlikely because we did not have actual 
groups present for evaluation (i.e., reality 
constraint) during our study nor did we ask 
our participants to critically examine their 
beliefs about groups of freedom fighters or 
rebel insurgents (i.e., process constraint). 
 Another possible explanation for lack 
of support in terms of attitude polarization 
and opportunity for thought may be that we 
did not allow participants to view group 
descriptions while participants were thinking. 
It was possible then that, without group 
descriptions in front of them, participants 
were distracted from thinking about those 
groups during their opportunity for thought. 
Researchers have found that individuals 
polarize their attitudes more so as a result of 
thought about an attitude object (i.e., groups 
of people) than when those individuals were 
distracted from thought about an attitude 
object (i.e., groups of people) (e.g., Leone & 
Ensley, 1986; Tesser & Leone, 1977). In our 
study, it is unlikely that lack of attitude 
polarization was due to participants’ 
distraction because we did not have a 
distraction condition. All participants in our 
study were given either 45 or 90 seconds to 
think about group descriptions.  
 Another possible explanation for lack 
of support in terms of attitude polarization 
and opportunity for thought may be that we 
did not provide our participants with 
sufficient opportunity for thought. In our 
experiment, participants received either a 45 
second or 90 second opportunity for thought. 
It is possible that our participants required 
more than 45 or 90 seconds to think about 
groups of people. However, it is not likely 
that opportunity for thought was a cause for 
lack of attitude polarization in our 
experiment. Other researchers have used 45 
versus 90 second opportunity for thought and 
have replicated the self-generated attitude 
change effect (e.g., Leone, 1994, 1996). 
 In terms of need for cognition, we 
found that low need for cognition individuals 
did not experience greater amounts of attitude 
polarization than did high need for cognition 
individuals. There was also no significant 
difference in attitude attenuation based on 
whether individuals were high or low in need 
for cognition. There seemed to simply be no 
differences in terms of attitude change based 
on whether our participants were high in need 
for cognition or low in need for cognition. 
 One plausible explanation for lack of 
support in terms of moderating effect of need 
for cognition on attitude polarization may 
have been participants’ completion of the 
Need for Cognition Scale.  In this study, 
participants completed the 18-item Need for 
Cognition Scale to measure individual 
differences in the tendency to seek out and 
enjoy effortful cognitive activities (Cacioppo 
et al., 1984). It is possible that participants 
could be primed by the Need for Cognition 
Scale such that they may alter their manner of 
thought. Participants may experience 
“priming” when they read something or 
perform a task that helps them recall a 
particular attitude (Smith, 1998). When 
participants do recall a particular attitude, 
they may also recall other related attitudes 
(e.g., Raghubir & Johar, 1997) or they may 
experience spreading activation of their 
attitudes (e.g., Judd, Downing, Drake, & 
Krosnick, 1991). It may also be more socially 
desirable for participants to view themselves 
as high in need for cognition and less socially 
desirable for participants to view themselves 
as low in need for cognition. Therefore, if 
participants took the Need for Cognition scale 
prior to thought portion of an experiment, 
then they may have been “primed” to think 
about groups of people in a manner consistent 
with expectations of high in need for 
cognition individuals. However, in our study, 
participants’ completion of the Need for 
Cognition Scale was not likely to be related to 
their attitude polarization because participants 
completed the questionnaire containing the 
scale after they completed all thought activity.  
Additionally, other researchers assessed 
people’s need for cognition along with 
measuring people’s attitude polarization and 
obtained the results they expected (e.g., 
    
Leone, 1994; Leone & Ensley, 1986; but see 
also Lassiter, Apple, & Slaw, 1996; Lassiter 
& Apple, 1998). 
  Another plausible explanation for the 
lack of support in terms of moderating effects 
of need for cognition on attitude polarization 
may be that our Need for Cognition Scale was 
invalid within this study. In this study, our 
scores on the Need for Cognition Scale were 
unusually skewed with many more 
individuals showing scores indicative of high 
need for cognition. There are several factors 
that may be related to this skewed set of 
scores. First, there are several psychology 
classes at the University of North Florida in 
which the Need for Cognition Scale is 
distributed and analyzed. Students are 
allowed to take this scale and then analyze 
their results to see if they are high or low in 
need for cognition. It is possible that these 
students recognized that high need for 
cognition was a more socially desirable trait 
and, therefore, they answered the Need for 
Cognition Scale within our research in a 
socially desirable manner. Although there is a 
possibility of contamination of results of the 
Need for Cognition Scale, it is not so 
plausible that this contamination occurred in 
our study. Our sample for this experiment 
came from many different students from 
many different psychology classes, therefore 
it does not seem plausible that a majority of 
our sample had been exposed to the Need for 
Cognition Scale prior to this experiment. 
 
Limitations of this Study. 
 One limiting factor in this study was 
an issue of self-report when measuring 
participants’ attitude change. We did not 
actually observe changes in behavior when 
measuring attitude change. In our study, we 
simply asked participants to report any 
changes in their feelings (i.e., attitudes). Other 
researchers have indicated that perhaps self-
report measures may not be as valid in 
assessing attitude change as other evaluation 
methods such as direct assessment (e.g., 
Miller, McHoskey, Bane, & Dowd, 1993; 
McHoskey, 1995). 
 Another limiting factor in this study 
was that there was no direct assessment of 
thought processing. In other words, we were 
not able to assess whether individuals were 
actually engaging in thought about groups of 
people during those individuals’ opportunity 
for thought. Several researchers have asked 
participant to write down their beliefs (i.e., 
thought listing) after an opportunity for 
thought and have found attitude polarization 
effects (e.g., Leone, 1989, 1994; Leone et al., 
1991). In our study, however, we did not ask 
our participants to list their beliefs after their 
opportunity for thought. Therefore, we were 
unable to measure whether or not our 
participants were actually thinking about the 
groups of people we asked them to think 
about. 
 Another limiting factor in this study 
was there was no direct assessment of 
individuals’ schemas about groups of freedom 
fighters or rebel insurgents. In other words, 
we were not able to assess whether 
individuals were able to “tune in” schemas 
about groups of freedom fighters or rebel 
insurgents. Other researchers have asked 
participants to write down their impressions 
of the attitude object (i.e., person, place, or 
thing) that those participants were thinking 
about and were then able to assess whether 
those individuals had well-developed or less-
developed schemas about that attitude object 
(e.g., Tesser & Danheiser, 1978). In our 
study, however, we did not ask our 
participants to list their impressions of groups 
of freedom fighters or rebel insurgents. 
Therefore, we were unable to measure 
whether or not our participants had well-
developed or less-developed schemas about 
groups of freedom fighters or rebel 
insurgents.     
 Another limiting factor within this 
study was a likelihood of media effects (i.e., 
news coverage of War on Terror) influencing 
our participants’ thoughts. In our study, we 
researched attitude change and perceptions of 
groups. In particular, we researched 
individuals’ attitudes toward groups of 
freedom fighters and rebel insurgents. This 
study took place after September 11, 2001 
    
and during the War on Terror. Therefore, it is 
quite probable that individuals’ attitudes 
toward groups of freedom fighters and rebel 
insurgents were influenced in part by news 
media exposure. If participants were 
influenced by media effects, then it is possible 
that those participants would have different 
attitudes about groups of freedom fighters and 
rebel insurgents depending on the amount and 
type of news coverage of the War on Terror 
those participants had viewed. Other 
researchers have found that individuals’ 
attitudes toward attitude objects were 
influenced by exposure to media (e.g., 
Garramone, Atkin, Pinkleton, & Cole, 1990; 
Malamuth & Check, 1981).     
 
Future Directions. 
 There are many implications for future 
research that have arisen as a result of our 
research on attitude change and perception of 
groups. In our study, we have explored only a 
small portion of self-generated attitude 
change as it pertained to participants’ 
attitudes toward groups of people. 
Additionally, we researched moderating 
effects of need for cognition on participants’ 
attitudes toward groups of people. There are, 
however, some additional areas related to 
self-generated attitude change that could be 
explored further in later research including 
comparisons of in-group bias and out-group 
bias, comparisons of differences in schema 
complexity between groups (e.g., freedom 
fighters) and individuals (e.g., a freedom 
fighter), incorporation of thought listing 
procedure into methodology, and study of 
different personality variables.  
 Our first possibility for future research 
is in areas of in-group versus out-group bias 
differences. In our study, we looked at 
individuals’ attitudes toward groups of 
freedom fighters and rebel insurgents. Most, 
if not all, individuals involved in our research 
would most likely not consider freedom 
fighters (e.g., American soldiers) or rebel 
insurgents (e.g., Al Qaeda) to be members of 
their in-group. Researchers have shown that 
individuals’ attitude and opinions toward 
other groups of people can be influenced by 
those individuals’ in-group/out-group bias 
(e.g., Downing & Monaco, 1986; Lee & 
Ottati, 2002). However, if we were to include 
in our study evaluations of attitudes toward 
groups that participants could consider as in-
groups (e.g., Republicans vs. Democrats) as 
well as groups that participants could consider 
as out-groups (e.g., freedom fighters vs. rebel 
insurgents), then perhaps we could compare 
those two sets of groups to see if there is a 
difference in how individuals’ form their 
attitudes about those groups. 
 A second possibility for future 
research is in areas of effects of schema 
complexity on attitude change. In our study, 
we had participants attempt to “tune in” 
schemas about groups of freedom fighter and 
rebel insurgents. Researchers have shown that 
most individuals have better developed 
schemas about individuals than they have 
about groups of individuals (Tesser & Leone, 
1977). If we were to include in our study an 
evaluation of both groups of people (e.g., 
rebel insurgents) and individuals (e.g., a rebel 
insurgent), then we may see that self-
generated attitude change does depend on 
whether participants think about an individual 
or a group of individuals.  
 A third possibility for future research 
involves expanding our thought portion of our 
experiment in future research. In our study, 
we asked participants to think about either a 
group of freedom fighters or a group of rebel 
insurgents for periods of 45 or 90 seconds. 
However, we did not include a manipulation 
check to see whether or not those individuals 
were able to generate thoughts about those 
groups. Several researchers have asked 
participant to write down their beliefs (i.e., 
thought listing) after an opportunity for 
thought and have found attitude polarization 
effects (e.g., Leone, 1989, 1994; Leone et al., 
1991). If we were to include a thought listing 
manipulation check in our future studies, then 
we may see variations in number of beliefs 
individuals’ are able to generate about 
freedom fighter and rebel insurgent groups. 
Using this thought listing manipulation, we 
may be able to assess how individuals’ 
abilities to generate beliefs about a certain 
    
group (i.e., the number of thoughts they list) 
may influence their attitudes about that group. 
 Our final possibility for future 
research involves expanding our research on 
personality variables and their moderating 
effects on attitude change. In our study, we 
had participants complete the Need for 
Cognition Scale so that we could determine 
whether individual difference in need for 
cognition influenced attitude change. Even 
though we did not find support for the 
moderating effects of need for cognition on 
attitude change in this particular study, there 
are many other personality variables (e.g., 
objectivism or dogmatism) that, if we 
incorporate them into future studies, may 
show moderating effects on attitude change. 
Other researchers have found differences in 
self-generated attitude change to be 
moderated by individual differences in 
objectivism (e.g., Leone, 1996) and 
dogmatism (e.g., Leone, 1989).      
 
Summary 
 Although the results of this current 
study did not turn out as we had expected, it is 
still important that researchers continue to 
look at self-generated attitude change because 
it is a concept that applies to many real world 
issues. There are real world applications of 
self-generated attitude change which can be 
used for reduction of fears (e.g., Leone & 
Aronow, 1992; Leone & Baldwin, 1983), 
reduction of phobias (e.g., Leone, 1984; 
Leone et al., 1983; Rothbaum, Hodges, 
Kooper, Opdyke, Williford, & North, 1995), 
and reduction of biased attitudes (e.g., Hall, 
Varca, & Fisher, 1985; Munro & Ditto, 1997). 
Self-generated attitude change applies to all 
three of these areas because as individuals 
think about certain objects (e.g., snakes, 
heights, or terrorists), they may begin to feel 
more afraid, more phobic, and more biased 
then they felt originally. 
 For example, in the months following 
September 11th, we saw continuous news 
coverage of these terrorist attacks and 
resulting loss of life. It would be very easy for 
individuals to begin to polarize their attitude 
toward terrorists because of this media 
influence. According to the Council of 
American-Islamic Relations and the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights, anti-Arab 
American sentiment rose markedly following 
the attacks on September 11, 2001 (Hohman, 
2002). Having extreme attitudes about 
September 11th may allow individuals to act 
out in a biased manner toward Middle Eastern 
individuals. By understanding certain 
mechanisms (e.g., self-generated attitude 
change) that underlie these feelings of fear, 
phobia, and bias, psychologists can develop 
real world applications to assist in the 
reduction of those extreme feelings.              
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